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I. INTRODUCTION
The challenges to the constitutionality of several
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act1 (ACA) should put an end to any question that health
law is a field.2 In court, the issues were presented as
∗

JD, LLM, MPH; Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law,
Boston University School of Public Health; Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law; Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences and
Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine. This
article was first presented as the McDonald-Merrill-Ketcham Memorial
Award Lecture at Indiana in April 2012. The author thanks all the
participants in the anniversary conference for comments and
suggestions.
1
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012). At least 28 cases challenged the individual mandate, the
expanded eligibility requirements for Medicaid, and/or the use of federal
funds to subsidize insurance coverage of contraception or abortion in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148, §
1501, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
2
Several scholars have examined the nature of the health law
field from different perspectives. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Health
Law at the Turn of the Century: From White Dwarf to Red Giant, 21
CONN. L. REV. 551 (1989); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health
Law, 91 CALIF. L. R EV. 247 (2003); Henry T. Greeley, Some Thoughts
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questions of constitutional law, specifically Congress’s
power to regulate commerce and to tax and spend for the
general welfare.3 Nevertheless, analyzing whether those
powers encompassed the minimum coverage requirement
(also known as the individual mandate) and the Medicaid
eligibility expansion necessitated more than passing
knowledge of health care and health insurance.
Constitutional scholars suddenly had to be health law
experts. The arguments and resulting opinions, however,
reflect significant gaps in knowledge about health insurance
and the health care system in general.
This essay argues that this gap in knowledge matters
and that it may offer lessons for improving legal education.
Part 1 considers how ACA litigation arguments framed in
traditional doctrinal terms missed much of the reality of
health care. This suggests that the legal education may
have failed to prepare advocates on both sides to identify
and explain relevant arguments. Thus, Part 2 summarizes
several relevant critiques of legal education. Part 3 then
considers aspects of health law that offer promising
responses to some of these critiques. Part 4 offers ideas for
a broader vision for educating scholars and lawyers in
health law. Most important, the legal profession, like the
medical profession, faces a system in which services are
increasingly costly and concentrated among those with the
greatest resources. The history of health reform itself may

on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391 (2006); Mark A.
Hall, The History and Future of Health Law: An Essentialist View, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (2006); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages
of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004); S. Sandy Sandbar et al.,
Legal Medicine and Health Law Education, in LEGAL MEDICINE 3 (S.
Sandy Sandbar et al. eds., 7th ed. 2007); Walter Wadlington, Some
Reflections on Teaching Law and Medicine in Law School Since the ‘60s,
14 H EALTH MATRIX 231 (2004); Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an
Architecture of Health Law, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 67 (2009).
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (“Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes . . . provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes.”).
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hold lessons for the legal system and how to prepare
lawyers to provide affordable services to all those in need.
II. THE ACA CHALLENGE WAS NOT AN EASY CASE
When the ACA was first challenged, some constitutional
That
scholars believed it would be an easy case.4
assumption was belied by the fact that both ACA opponents
and supporters believed it was an easy case. Nothing as
path breaking as the ACA, the most significant national
legislation in the health care field since the 1965 enactment
of Medicare and Medicaid, was likely to be easy.
Nonetheless, to many, the constitutional questions seemed
straightforward when viewed from a traditional scholarly
point of view. But, there were at least two points of view,
based in large part on conceptions of federal power, and
neither was adequate to argue or predict the outcome.
Neither side fully understood how “commerce” and
“spending” functioned in the health care system, so their
arguments remained largely abstract and detached from the
facts. To varying degrees, the Justices reflected a similar
detachment in their opinions in the case.
By now, the arguments are well known and will not be
repeated here. Suffice it to say that the arguments over the
minimum coverage requirement parsed cases on Congress’s
Article I powers to tax and spend and to regulate
commerce.5 The briefs, oral arguments, published articles,
and the decision itself repeatedly analyzed Supreme Court
decisions like Wickard,6 Lopez,7 Raich,8 and Comstock.9
4
See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., A Healthy Debate: The
Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV.

PENNUMBRA 93 (2009).
5
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why
the Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 581 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to
Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 (2011); Jack M. Balkin,
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010).
6
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
7
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
8
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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None of these cases offered an exact precedent for the
minimum coverage requirement.
Congress had never
imposed a precisely comparable requirement on individuals
before.10 This alone made it a difficult case.
Of course, the fact that a law is novel does not make it
unconstitutional.11 During the Great Depression, the Social
Security Act was vigorously challenged as an unprecedented
expansion of federal government authority to tax and spend
– a point that Justice Ginsburg tried to make in the ACA
oral argument.12
In 1937, the Social Security Act
challengers argued that Congress’s power to tax and spend
for the general welfare did not include the power to pay oldage pensions only to the elderly. In Helvering v. Davis, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social
Security tax on employees to provide pensions to the
elderly,13 but the outcome was not a foregone conclusion.
Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented on the grounds
that the Act was “repugnant to the Tenth Amendment,” 14
just as the ACA challengers argued that the individual
mandate invades state sovereignty.
Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo apparently felt
compelled to explain the national need for federal financial
aid. He did so in language that could apply to health
insurance today:

9

United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).

See Wendy K. Mariner, Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas,
Reframing Federalism—The Affordable Care Act (and Broccoli) in the
Supreme Court, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 12 (2012).
11
But see Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2586 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
10

(“But sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress's action.”).
12
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Dep’t of Health and
Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11398-Tuesday.pdf.
13
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the
Social Security Act income tax on employees); see also Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act excise
tax on employers).
14
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 646 (Reynolds, J. and Butler, J.,
dissenting).
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Needs that were narrow or parochial a century
ago may be interwoven in our day with the wellbeing of the nation. What is critical or urgent
change with the times.
The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in
1929 has taught us many lessons. . . . Spreading
from state to state, unemployment is an ill not
particular but general, which may be checked, if
Congress so determines, by the resources of the
nation. . . . But the ill is all one . . . whether men
are thrown out of work because there is no
longer work to do or because the disabilities of
age make them incapable of doing it. Rescue
becomes necessary irrespective of the cause.
The hope behind this statute is to save men and
women from the rigors of the poor house . . . .15
This kind of contextual explanation was largely missing
from the ACA litigation.16
Without it, however,
15

Id. at 641.

An exception was Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s last minute
plea at end of the last day of oral argument:
16

There is an important connection, a profound
connection between that problem and liberty. And I do
think it’s important that we not lose sight of that . . .
[because of the Medicaid expansion] there will be
millions of people with chronic conditions like diabetes
and heart disease, and as a result of the health care they
will get, they will be unshackled from the disabilities
that those diseases put on them and have the
opportunity to enjoy the blessings of liberty. And the
same will be true for – for a husband whose wife is
diagnosed with breast cancer and who won’t face the
prospect of being forced into bankruptcy to try to get
care for his wife and face the risk of having to raise his
children alone, and I could multiply example after
example after example.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 79-80, Dep’t of Health and Human
Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400), available at http://
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constitutional doctrine was not sufficient to resolve a matter
of first impression either way.17 The Court’s majority and
dissenting opinions found little precedent to support their
conclusions, despite occasionally tortured efforts to identify
analogies and distinctions in earlier cases. But this should
not mean that novel cases can be decided on the basis of the
Justices’ outcome preferences. Where doctrine alone cannot
control, it becomes necessary to understand what the law at
issue actually does, so that doctrine can be refined in
principled ways. The novelty of the ACA meant applying
doctrine – which itself was less than crystal clear – to
complex issues of health care and health insurance
financing. Resolving the constitutional question depended
on knowledge of the health care system, insurance, and how
insurance is used to pay for health care. Few, if any,
constitutional scholars or practitioners had that
knowledge.18
Counsel for the challengers framed the Commerce
Clause claim most simply: that a requirement to obtain
health coverage was simply a mandate to buy a commercial
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-400.
pdf.
17
See Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz,

Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli? And Why That’s a Hard
Question, 364 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 201 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce
Clause Challenges to Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 (2011).

18
Few people – lawyers and judges included – understand health
insurance. And few of those who understand insurance in general
understand health insurance, which functions quite differently from
traditional indemnity insurance for things like cars and houses. See
generally Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to

Do with It? Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of
Insurance, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 436 (2010). Some economists with

expertise in the health care industry readily understood the rationale
for requiring almost everyone to participate in an insurance pool, and
many supported the minimum coverage requirement. See Brief for
Economic Scholars in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on the
Minimum Coverage Issue at 2-5, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. v.
Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/11-398.html;
JONATHAN
GRUBER, HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT IT IS, W HY IT’S NECESSARY,
HOW IT WORKS (2011). But they were not in a position to present a
doctrinal argument.
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product, which amounted to requiring people to engage in
commerce, not regulating any existing commerce.19 Of
course, the ACA permits the coverage requirement to be
satisfied by government-funded health benefit programs,
such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as
employee group health plans.20 Nevertheless, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito
accepted the characterization of health insurance as a
commercial product.21 Thus, if Congress could require
individuals to buy this commercial product, then surely it
could require individuals to buy other products.22 In light of
See Brief for State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage
Provision at 15, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/preview_home/11-398.html.
20
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2010); Paul Fronstin, Sources of
19

Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the
March 2012 Current Population Survey, EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 376, Sept. 2012, at 4, available at
http://www.ebri.com/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=51
14 (noting that 18% of the nonelderly population was not covered by
health insurance in 2011).
21
See generally Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566. The Chief Justice and
the Justices in the Joint Dissent described health insurance only as a
commercial product, and then only in terms of traditional non-group
indemnity insurance, which is underwritten so that it is actuarially fair:
you only pay for your own personal risks. However, all but a small
proportion of health insurance in the United States is either public
benefit programs or private employee group insurance, which is not
underwritten. See Fronstin, supra note 20, at 5 fig. 1; Paul Fronstin,

Employment-Based Health Benefits: Trends in Access and Coverage,
1997-2010, EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 370, Apr.
2012, available at http://www.ebri.com/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=

ibDisp&content_id=5042. Only about 7 percent of the nonelderly U.S.
population is covered by underwritten, individual (non-group) health
insurance policies. Fronstin, supra note 20, at 5, fig. 1.
22
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (“The mandate primarily affects
healthy, often young adults who are less likely to need significant health
care and have other priorities for spending their money.”), at 2642
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting). In fact, the
major reason that people are uninsured is that they cannot afford the
cost of insurance.
SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR THE U.S.
POPULATION: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF
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the breadth of commerce in today’s national and global
markets, such an expansive power looks more like the
states’ police power than a specific, enumerated federal
power. These five Justices expressly sought to preserve the
distinction between federal and state sovereignty.23 Their
solution was to draw a bright line between those who are
and are not active or engaged in interstate commerce, with
federal authority to regulate commerce limited to the
former.24 Although the Justices did not constrict the scope
of Congress’s commerce power, the majority would not
expand it to include the power to require individuals to do
something.25
Applying the active/inactive in commerce rule may not
be as easy as the Justices seemed to assume. As Judge
Sutton noted in his concurring opinion upholding the
individual mandate for the sixth circuit Court of Appeals
below, many instances of doing nothing can be
characterized as doing something else and vice versa.26 The
absence of any analysis of how the boundaries may blur
deprives the majority’s commerce clause opinions of some
measure of persuasiveness.27
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor
and Kagan, dissented from the majority’s commerce clause
conclusions. Her
opinion demonstrated a better
understanding of the health care system. It viewed health
insurance not as a fungible commercial product, but as a
necessary means of paying for health care.28 Since virtually
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 71 table 25 (2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_248.pdf.
23
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2575, 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J.,
Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 2591.
25
Id.
26
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560-63 (6th Cir.
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring), cert. denied, (2012) (abrogated by
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566).
27
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“[I]f history
is any guide, today’s construction of the Commerce Clause will not
endure.”).
28
Id. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J.).
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everyone uses health care, they are already engaged in
commerce, so the coverage requirement simply regulated
how and when they pay for care.29 This, she argued, would
not open the door to federal requirements that individuals
buy cars or vegetables, because other products do not share
health insurance’s characteristics.30 This was a more
complex argument to make, one requiring knowledge of the
health care system.
The majority and minority Justices appeared to view the
case through the lens of federalism. What was needed to
convince a majority of the Justices to uphold the ACA’s
federal mandate under the Commerce Clause was a
principled distinction between a requirement for health
insurance coverage and a requirement to buy anything else
– one that also served to distinguish the Commerce power
from the police power.31 Such a distinction depended on
facts specific to the health care system that would not apply
to the purchase of all products.32 In short, to win the
commerce clause argument, the government needed a
limiting principle, and neither the government nor any
Justice was able to articulate a sufficiently convincing one.33
29
Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J.) (“Persons subject to the mandate must
now pay for medical care in advance (instead of at the point of service)
and through insurance (instead of out of pocket).”).
30
Id. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J.) (“One could call this concern the
‘broccoli horrible,’” referring to the Chief Justice’s mention of a mandate
to buy green vegetables).
31
Id. at 2591, 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J.,
dissenting).
32
The Brief of 104 Health Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at page three, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. v.
Fla., 132 S. Ct 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/
briefs/11-398_petitioneramcu104healthlawprofs.authcheckdam.pdf
(offering a factual description) was submitted to provide the Court with
those facts. Together with Mark A. Hall, the author helped draft the
Brief, organized health law professors’ participation, engaged counsel,
and signed the Brief.
33
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J.,
Alito, J., dissenting). Paul Clement, representing the state challengers,
argued that the federal government had no limiting principle for
Congress’s power to require individuals to buy commercial products,
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Instead, both the parties and the Justices argued the case in
terms of abstract principles of federalism and barely looked
beyond their own preferred interpretations of the Commerce
power.
A better understanding of health insurance itself might
have compelled the Justices to think more deeply about
what was being regulated. In the absence of cogent
explanations, the Court was left with an inadequate factual
basis for determining whether the commerce power could
apply to the minimum coverage requirement without
implying that Congress could force people to enter markets
involuntarily.34 Thus, the Justices’ opinions tracked their

and began his oral argument by stating that the individual mandate is
“an unprecedented effort by Congress to compel individuals to enter
commerce.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Dep’t of Health and
Human Serv. v. Fla., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). See Mariner,
supra note 17, at 201-201 (noting the need for a persuasive limiting
principle). This is not the first time that constitutional law scholars
have misjudged the Supreme Court in health law cases. Professor
Laurence Tribe argued on behalf of patients for the right to have
physicians assist their suicides. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). At
the time, colleagues suggested that it should be an easy win: the
Supreme Court would find a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide and strike down laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide,
perhaps relying on Justice Kennedy’s “mystery of human life” language
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992). But, the Court did not do so. Its decision made clear that the
Court wanted a limiting principle on the purported right to assisted
suicide, which the litigants did not provide. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 733 (1997).
34
The majority’s decision on the Medicaid eligibility expansion
also demonstrated incomplete knowledge of the structure and history of
Medicaid, but the decisive factor appeared to be preserving state
jurisdiction over the state’s laws implementing Medicaid programs.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601-8. The Chief Justice’s opinion relied for the
first time on the concept of coercion to find that the spending power
precluded the federal government from ending all federal Medicaid
funding of states that declined to adopt the newest category of eligible
beneficiaries (adults under 65 years of age with incomes less than 133%
of the federal poverty level) added by the ACA. Id. at 2606-7; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396c (2012).
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views of the boundary between federal and state
jurisdiction.35
The idea that the parties failed to appreciate relevant
facts about the structure and financing of the health care
system is significant, but not because a factual analysis
should displace doctrinal analysis.
Rather, doctrine
requires interpretation when it is applied to new subject
matter, and meaningful application of doctrine requires an
accurate understanding of the subject matter. If the subject
matter is misunderstood, the doctrine may be interpreted in
incongruous ways, which may distort doctrine in its
applications in other contexts.36 Regardless of whether such
an analysis would have upheld the individual mandate, it
should have produced a more robust and persuasive
refinement of the definition of commerce.
III. DOES LEGAL EDUCATION CONTRIBUTE TO INEFFECTUAL
SCHOLARSHIP OR PRACTICE?
Two conclusions can be drawn from the public and
courtroom debate over the constitutionality of the individual
35
This is not to say that the Justices are motivated by public
opinion or politics, which are not the same as ideology. See Lawrence
Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not
the American People, 98 GEO. L. J. 1515 (2010) (arguing that the
Justices probably care more about the opinions of elites than the public).
36
For example, in his opinion on the Medicaid expansion, the
Chief Justice called the addition of the new eligibility category “a shift
in kind, not merely degree.” Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 1575. Yet, the
opinion does not identify any relevant factual distinction between the
eligibility categories originally in effect and added by pre-2010
amendments and the category added by the ACA. See generally Sara
Rosenbaum & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, All Heat, No Light – The States’
Medicaid Claims before the Supreme Court, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED . 487
(2012). Without a clear distinction, the decision invites confusion and
future litigation over whether statutory amendments qualify as
amendments or create entirely new programs. The Joint Dissent’s
characterization of generous federal funding as “coercive” is similarly
unclear. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas,
J., and Alito, J., dissenting). See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); S.D. v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987).
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mandate: (1) health law issues pervade modern society; and
(2) well trained lawyers failed to adequately explain or
justify their positions on the constitutionality of the ACA.
Both conclusions suggest that legal education may be
missing an opportunity to prepare both scholars and
practicing lawyers for effective careers today. Several
critiques of legal education offer clues to what might
contribute to this missed opportunity.
The critiques of interest here are a highly selective
sample.37 I will not address the challenges that universities
themselves face, which include increasing competition for
students in a difficult economic environment with rising
costs, income inequality, and high student loan debt,38

37
For comprehensive overviews, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
FAILING L AW SCHOOLS (2012); Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or
Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735
(2011). Well known studies of legal education include WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER , LLOYD BOND & L EE
S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (The Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of
Teaching ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; AM. BAR ASS’N,
SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR & TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT – AN EDUCATION
CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; AM. BAR ASS’N,
SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY:
THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979) [hereinafter CRAMPTON REPORT].
38
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES - HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED TO
LAW
SCHOOL
COST
AND
ACCESS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1020.pdf. The Project on Student Debt
at the Institute for College Access & Success estimated that “two-thirds
of college seniors who graduated in 2010 had student loan debt, with an
average of $25,250.” Student Debt and the Class of 2010, THE
INSTITUTE FOR COLLEGE ACCESS & SUCCESS (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://ticas.org/files/pub/classof2010.pdf. See The Student Loan “Debt

Bomb”: America’s Next Mortgage-Style Economic Crisis?: A Report
Prepared for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys
(NACBA),
NACBA
(Feb.
7,
2012),

http://nacba.org/Portals/0/Documents/Student%20Loan%20Debt/020712
%20NACBA%20student%20loan%20debt%20report.pdf (reporting that
“Americans now owe more on student loans than on credit cards.”). The
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technological advances, and pressure to disclose graduate
employment data,39 reduce tuition, augment endowments,
and demonstrate the value-added of a university
education.40 Most law schools sit within universities, and
their fate is tied to a significant degree with the fate of their
university.41
But law schools face their own unique
challenges. Perhaps the most pressure to conform to a
traditional model of legal education comes from the
rankings, whose criteria drive law schools’ activities and
metrics.42 But these are so well known, and almost

total amount of outstanding student loans exceeded $1 trillion in 2011.
Id. at 1.
39
The American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, the accrediting body for U.S. law schools,
adopted a requirement in June 2012, approved by the ABA House of
Delegates in August 2012, that law schools disclose data on graduates’
employment, student attrition, and scholarships conditioned on
minimum grades.
Debra Cassens Weiss, No Fudging:
Revised
Standard Bars Law Schools from Publishing Misleading Consumer Info,
JOURNAL
(Aug.
2,
2012),
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_standard_b
ars_law_schools_from_publishing_misleadin (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
40
In an address at the University of Michigan in January 2012,
President Obama said:
“So, from now on, I’m telling Congress we should steer federal
campus-based aid to those colleges that keep tuition affordable, provide
good value, serve their students well. We are putting colleges on notice .
. . . If you can’t stop tuition from going up, then the funding you get
from taxpayers each year will go down.” Obama in Ann Arbor: Text of
the President’s Speech on Affordability, ANNARBOR.COM (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.annarbor.com/news/obama-in-ann-arbor-text-of-thepresidents-speech-on-college-affordability/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
41
Gene R. Nichol, Rankings, Economic Challenge, and the Future
of Legal Education, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 345 (2012).
42
See TAMANAHA, supra note 37, at 78-99; Michael Sauder &
Wendy Espeland, Fear of Falling: The Effect of U.S. News & World
Report Rankings on U.S. Law Schools — Grant Report 07-02, in L. SCH.
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL REPORT SERIES 9-15
(2007), available at
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/research/gr/gr-07-02.asp; Deborah L.
Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34
IND. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000).
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universally lamented, that there is no need to mention them
further.43
The best-known criticisms of legal education are what I
call the Ivory Tower Critiques. These argue that legal
education (1) is overly abstract and distant from real world
problems, with too much emphasis on theory, (2) offers
limited attention to practice issues, in particular, what
lawyers do interacting with clients, prosecutors, businesses,
administrative agencies, and other lawyers, and (3)
produces scholarship of limited relevance to practitioners or
judges.44
Legal education has been criticized for its distance from
practice for decades, notably by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome
Frank.45 A notorious example of the ivory tower critique is
Justice Roberts’ comment at a 4th Circuit Judicial
Conference in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in
June 2011. He reportedly said:

43
This essay also does not address styles of teaching or student
learning, student stress, exams and methods of assessment, law school
accreditation, or false advertising about law jobs after graduation,
which has been much in the news recently. See, e.g., Rogelio A. Lasso,

Is Our Students Learning? Using Assessments to Measure and Improve
Law School Learning and Performance, 15 BARRY L. REV. 73 (2010); G.
Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 11 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 225 (1986); Ann L. Iijima, Lessons Learned: Legal
Education and Law Student Dysfunction, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524
(1998); David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the A.B.A.’s Way,

N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/
business/for-law-schools-a-price-to-play-the-abas-way.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0.
44
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992);
Stewart Macauly, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II:
Some Notes on Two Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 506 (1982); CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 95-97;
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37; CRAMPTON REPORT, supra note 37, at
3-4, 15-18.
45
See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:
SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Jerome Frank, Why
Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933).
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Pick up a copy of any law review that you see,
and the first article is likely to be, you know,
the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary
approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or
something, which I’m sure was of great
interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t
of much help to the bar.46
Perhaps this is why judges rarely read law review
articles. Few law school professors would dispute the claim
that their legal research, at least before tenure review,
focuses on developing novel theories of law, which are read
almost exclusively by other law professors.47
The grain of truth in the ivory tower critique – one that
is relevant to the ACA litigation – is that the focus on
theory may blind lawyers to the need for more specific and
intensive examination of the subject matter to which theory
and doctrine may apply. However, this does not mean that
law schools ought to abandon rigorous teaching about
theory and doctrine.48 Such teaching is foundational –
necessary, but not sufficient. Rather, the critique raises the
perennial question of whether law schools should be
training practitioners, as in the historical trade school
model, or educating research scholars, as in the traditional
Ph.D model.49
46
Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on
Academic Scholarship, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG (July 5, 2011),

http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justiceroberts%E2%80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship (last visited Nov. 8,
2012).
47
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV . 881,
885 (2009).
48
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal
Training and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV . 1921 (1993); George L.
Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial
Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards,
91 MICH. L. REV . 1929 (1993); Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major
American Law School, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1993).
49
See William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of

Professional Legal Training and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in
Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 201 (1996).
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Law schools and lawyers have struggled with the
question of which model suits legal education since the Civil
War era.50
Nineteenth century German and other
European university systems, which had established
faculties in theology, philosophy, medicine, and law,
apparently impressed several influential academics.51 The
European conception of law as a science that required
formal study distinguished the legal profession from a mere
guild for craftsmen.52 It helped to characterize law as an
academic discipline, instead of a trade, and worthy of
placement within a university at a time when universities
were becoming research institutions. It also offered an
opportunity to develop an elite class of law professors
capable of teaching the science – full-time academics who
gradually replaced practicing lawyers as teachers.53 These
attractions elevated research and scholarship over
occupational training as the benchmark for academic
standing.
The development of formal legal education
supplanted apprenticeship with practicing lawyers and
culminated in today’s model of a three-year program of
graduate studies following a university undergraduate
degree.54

ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850’S TO THE 1980’S 24, 51, 135, 265 (1983). See
generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:
THE LAW MAKERS (1950).
51
See Gail J. Hupper, The Rise of an Academic Doctorate in Law:
Origins Through World War II, 49 AM. J. L EGAL HIST. 1, 8-9 (2007)
(noting the Presidents of Harvard, Cornell and Chicago as examples).
For an example of this influence, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Use
and Meaning of Law Schools, and Their Methods of Instruction, 20 AM .
L. REV. 919 (1886).
52
STEVENS, supra note 50, at 52-53; James E. Herget, The
Influence of German Thought on American Jurisprudence, 1880-1918,
in THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW
WORLD 1820-1920 203, 215 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).
53
Mathias Reimann, A Career in Itself—The German
Professoriate as a Model for American Legal Academia, in THE
RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD
1820-1920 165, 188 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).
54 STEVENS, supra note 50, at 205, 209.
50
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Law professors have been expected to write scholarly
articles, perhaps since then Dean of Harvard Law School
urged it as one of three essential elements of the faculty in
1901.55 Yet, the quality of law faculty scholarship is highly
variable. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ critique, there are
thoughtful, relevant and useful law review articles (many of
them in health law).56 However, the more practical and
relevant they are, the less likely they are to provide support
for tenure. If we are honest, we must concede that the
pressure to be original in theory or, to a lesser extent,
doctrine can produce irrelevant – sometimes ridiculous –
scholarship that would never be accepted in any other field
of research.57 Furthermore, there is almost no supervision

James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS
364 (1913) (noting that the other elements are teaching, id. at 362, and
influencing legislation and the development of the law, id. at 367).
56
See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, New York Times Financial Advice:
Be an Unpaid Intern Through Your 20s (The Work till You’re 100),
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 20, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/11/newyork-times-financial-advice-be.html (noting Nicolas Terry’s “cutting
edge work on digital medical records”); Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong
with Health Privacy? 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1 (2009); Sidney D.
Watson, The Road from Massachusetts to Missouri: Can Other States
Replicate Massachusetts’ Health Reform, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1331 (2007).
57
See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (“The fact that suicide is currently illegal
marks a classic form of heavy-handed paternalism . . . . An alternative
policy . . . is to sanction suicide, but only after a mandatory cooling-off
period. Such a policy might, for example, require a suicidal person to
‘give notice’ of the desire to commit suicide one month in advance with
the ability to rescind the notice at any point during the intervening
period.”). The authors were apparently not aware that suicide was (and
is) not illegal, so their factual premise was in error. Instead, they made
an interesting theoretical argument for replacing the non-existent crime
with an impractical alternative, since a majority of suicide attempts are
spur of the moment decisions, which are not likely to be affected by any
notice requirement. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REDUCING SUICIDE: A
NATIONAL IMPERATIVE (S.K. Goldsmith et al. eds., 2002); Keith
Hawton, Christopher Ware, Hamant Mistry, et al., Why Patients
55

Choose Paracetamol for Self-Poisoning and Their Knowledge of Its
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of the accuracy of legal research.58 Student journal editors
are well trained in paragraph structure and reference
formatting, but are rarely familiar with the subject matter
of the article they “edit.” Few law journals use peer review
to vet articles submitted for publication, so external experts
have no opportunity to evaluate the premises, methods or
conclusions of papers before publication. Moreover, few
experts who are able to notice errors even read the journals.
Law students typically rely on law review articles for their
own research, so that errors embedded in journals are often
perpetuated rather than corrected over time.
Law schools do some things well.
The very first
observation of the Carnegie Report was:
Within months of their arrival in law school,
students demonstrate new capacities for
understanding legal processes, for seeing both
sides of legal arguments, for sifting through
facts and precedents in search of the more
plausible account, for using precise language,
and for understanding the applications and
conflicts of legal rules. Despite a wide variety
of social backgrounds and undergraduate
experiences, they are learning, in the parlance
of legal education, to ‘think like a lawyer.’59
Learning how to think like a lawyer is especially
valuable for issue-spotting, but it has a downside. One
Dangers, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 164.1 (1995), available at http://www
.bmj.com/content/310/6973/164.1.
58
There is some irony in the fact that legal scholarship was
intended to resemble that of research for Ph.D.s in university
departments, partly to justify legal studies as graduate level academic
work, but did not adopt the same oversight and peer review
requirements. See STEVENS, supra note 50.
59
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER,
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: P REPARATION
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW , SUMMARY 5 (The Carnegie Found. for
the Advancement of Teaching ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
SUMMARY]. Critiques of the Carnegie Report soon proliferated. See,
e.g., Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353
(2012).
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disadvantage arises from the use of casebooks, which
publish highly edited versions of reported appellate cases —
stripped of factual details — to demonstrate legal
principles. The Carnegie Report observes that:
most law schools emphasize the priority of
analytic thinking, in which students learn to
categorize and discuss persons and events in
highly generalized terms. This emphasis on
analysis and system has profound effects in
shaping a legal frame of mind. At a deep,
largely uncritical level, the students come to
understand the law as a formal and rational
system, however much its doctrines and rules
may diverge from the common sense
understandings of the lay person.60
The idea that law is a science – a set of (ideally neutral)
principles that can be discerned with the appropriate
analytic and conceptual skills – remains embedded in the
core justification for legal education.61 US law schools
narrowed the scope of the original European idea of law as
science. Nineteenth century European curricula included
history, economics, political theory, sociology, Roman law,
and comparative law as part of the study of law. US law
schools dropped those subjects for decades and only slowly
reintroduced them in somewhat different forms, typically
under specialized rubrics like law and economics and law
and society.62
To be sure, critiques from successive
movements – legal realism, positivism, critical legal theory,
feminist theory, and social theory – have substantially
CARNEGIE SUMMARY, supra note 59, at 5.
See generally STEVENS, supra note 50; Herget, supra note 52.
62
STEVENS, supra note 50, at 277. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010); Sabine Frerichs, Studying
Law, Economy and Society: A Short History of Socio-Legal Thinking,
60
61

(U. Helsinki Research Paper Series, Legal Studies Research Paper
Series No. 19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022891;
MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977);
ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976).
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weakened law’s claim to universality and neutrality.63 But
the core claim is hard to give up. If law is simply the result
of power struggles, what science remains for law schools to
teach? Our students might be better off in departments of
political science, economics, or sociology.64
The solution cannot be to ignore theory or return to the
days of apprenticeship training. However, insistence on
developing novel and arcane theories divorced from the
factors that influence law is driving scholarship farther
away from making a meaningful contribution to
jurisprudence.65 The future of law schools may depend on a
revolutionary rethinking of their structure and curriculum.
Of course, law schools have not ignored these challenges.
Nonetheless, a multitude of obstacles has stymied
meaningful change. Most valuable reforms implemented so
far, such as clinical seminars and externships, tend to be
additions to a crowded curriculum.66 Moreover, they are
often taught by clinical faculty, who complain of second
class citizenship, often quite rightly.67 The real problem is
that patching in new courses does little to change the
perspective of legal education.

63
See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM
(2004); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986);
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1017
(1981); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 B UFFALO L. REV. 459
(1979).
64
See generally David Van Zandt et al., The Case Against Law
School, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfor
debate/2011/07/21/the-case-against-law-school?hp (discussing the need
for law schools and their structure).
65
See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise,
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313
(1995).
66
See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy,
Clinical Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 1 (2000).
67
See Elliott S. Milstein, Clinical Legal Education in the United
States: In-House Clinics, Externships, and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 375 (2001) (describing the range of programs).
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This brings me to a different set of criticisms of legal
education, which I call the Social Justice Critique. This
critique argues that many programmatic elements of the
curriculum narrow the scope of legal analysis to one that
preserves the status quo, perpetuates powerful elites68 and
stifles creative thinking about the law and solutions to legal
problems. Of particular concern is the categorization of
required and elective courses.
To social critics, the
foundational courses of contracts, torts, civil procedure, and
property immediately establish an image of law as
primarily private case law. This private law emphasis
reinforces the idea that corporate and property issues are
the core of law, because they are the focus of learning how
to think like lawyers. Directly or indirectly, it can train
students to accept the existing structure of public and
private institutions and financial relationships as
normative and neutral in their effects, and thus to
perpetuate the status quo.69
Courses in legislation, administrative law, employment
law, anti-discrimination law, and the like are typically
relegated to elective status, creating the impression such
subjects are peripheral in value. This can create a distorted
picture of the legal landscape, especially since so much legal
practice involves the drafting, interpretation, and
application of legislation and regulations.
While the case method has substantial value in learning
to think like a lawyer, the use of edited casebooks
68
Joan Williams notes that “one role of law school has been to
train members of the elite to assume elite positions,” and “Langdell
invented his curriculum at Harvard to boss around other members of
the elite,” but adds that it now also serves as a pathway for non-elites to
enter the elite class. Bob Gordon, Jack Schlegel, James May & Joan
Williams, Colloquium: Legal Education Then and Now: Changing

Patterns in Legal Training and in the Relationship of Law Schools to
the World Around Them, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 769 (1998).

69
The expense of a legal education and the concentration of
employment in corporate-oriented practice may exacerbate this effect,
making access to justice unaffordable for low and middle-income
Americans. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal
Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES . L. REV. 325 (2010);
Rhode, supra note 42, at 23.
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sometimes undermines creative thinking.70 Some casebooks
drain the life out of legal problems. Few contain facts to
illuminate the context of legal problems. The discussion of
cases leads students to focus on the legal issue, separate
and apart from the social context. Problems are abstracted
from their human dimension and considered only with
respect to whether they fall within a rule.71 The Supreme
Court’s oral arguments exemplified a similar “bloodless”
debate. It teaches that the ethical and social consequences
of justifiable principles are beyond the scope of relevant
consideration.
The absence of context – how and why legal problems
arise in a particular society – gives students little
opportunity for thinking about how to make strategic
choices.72 Without practice at attention to context, law
graduates may not recognize the complexity of their clients’
problems.73 In light of the dynamic nature of many legal
rules, and especially regulations, there is significant need
for thinking carefully not only about what legal remedies
are available, but also why only these and not others exist,
and whether others could be developed. In this way, context
can nurture useful new theories in law.
The Carnegie Report also notes that law schools pay less
attention to the civic, professional, ethical and leadership
roles of lawyers.74 Thus, graduates may miss important
opportunities to exercise leadership to improve social

70
See generally Todd D. Rakoff & Martha L. Minow, A Case for
Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597 (2007) (critiquing the case
method); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix:
Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity,

60 VAND. L. R EV. 515 (2007) (critiquing the case method); Laura
Kalman, To Hell with Langdell, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771 (1995)
(critiquing the case method).
71
See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 187.
72
See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST:
LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
73
See Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 353 (2012).
74
See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 6. See also Angela P.
Harris & Marjorie Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”: Toward
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993).
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institutions.75 Furthermore, a tight focus on legal doctrine
can breed hammer-and-nail problems: when your only tool
is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. If law is your
tool, you may tend to view law as the sole cause of – and
therefore the only solution to – a problem.76 Sometimes,
law is not the answer. Lawyers who fail to recognize
complex sources of problems causes can miss the most
effective solutions.
IV. HEALTH LAW OFFERS A MODEL FOR RETHINKING LEGAL
EDUCATION, AT LEAST IN PART
The health law field suffers less from these criticisms
than do most other legal fields and has several advantages
that could be translated to other areas in the law
curriculum.
A particular advantage of health law in
responding to critiques of legal education is that, as an
applied area, it cannot avoid attention to real world
problems. Moreover, these problems range across social and
economic life from birth to death, exposing students to a
wide array of both doctrinal and practical issues.77 After

75
See Karen H. Rothenberg, Recalibrating the Moral Compass:
Expanding “Thinking Like a Lawyer” into “Thinking Like a Leader”, 40

U. TOL. L. REV . 411 (2009).
76
For example, liability for injury is often cited as a major cause of
problems like the high cost of some pharmaceuticals, the limited
development of new vaccines, the price of medical malpractice
premiums, and insufficient volunteers in emergencies, without
examining other reasons, such as low return on investment, lack of
market demand or resources, or better alternatives. See generally
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antibiotic Markets
for Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. H EALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
101 (2011); Charles H. Schultz & George J. Annas, Altering the
Standard of Care — Unnecessary and Dangerous, 59 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED . 191 (2011); Marc A. Rodwin, Hak J. Chang & Jeffrey
Clausen, Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income: Perceptions of
a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 HEALTH AFF. 759 (2006);
William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor’s
Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463 (2005);
77
See Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a Laboratory for the
Study of Law and Policy, 38 J. L EGAL ED. 499, 499 (1988) (noting that

24

INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

all, in 2010, national health expenditures were $2.6 trillion
dollars or 17.9% of GDP.78 Thus, health law teaching and
scholarship is firmly connected to the real world. Even
theoretical scholarship in the health law field demands
connection to facts.79
Health law issues also invite – indeed demand –
attention to the larger context in which legal problems
arise, because the consequences of interpreting some laws
in one way rather than another can be significant when
health is at stake.80 At the same time, the process of
applying different laws can inspire new theories and
valuable critiques of doctrine in light of their implications
for solving legal problems.81 Ethical issues are especially
salient, and not just in abortion, euthanasia, and treatment
refusal.82 For instance, laws governing medical marijuana
should take into account how effective medical treatments
for different diseases are. Evaluating conflicts of interest
among researchers requires familiarity with the way in
other fields “lack the magnitude, complexity and universality of health
care”).
78
Anne B. Martin et al., Growth In US Health Spending

Remained Slow In 2010; Health Share Of Gross Domestic Product Was
Unchanged From 2009, 31 HEALTH AFF. 208, 208-9 & exhibit. 1 (2012).

79
To be sure, as in all fields, health law scholarship includes
theory divorced from facts, but that is a different question of the quality
and accuracy of scholarship, not its subject matter. See infra notes 95–
99 and accompanying text.
80
GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE:
T HE LAW OF
AMERICAN BIOETHICS 246-249 (1993).
81
See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH,
AND THE LAW (2009) (infusing constitutional doctrine with public health
values); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy
in Health Care, 97 GEO. L. J. 1 (2008); Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law, &
Medicine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2003).
82
Many biomedical ethics texts present issues that also raise legal
questions. See, e.g., ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE (Bonnie
Steinbock, John Arras & Alex John London, eds., 7th ed. 2008); G EORGE
J. ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS xv (2005) (reiterating that “American
law, not philosophy or medicine, is primarily responsible for the agenda,
development and current state of American bioethics”). Some casebooks
now combine both ethical and legal issues. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE L AW
AND E THICS, (Mark A. Hall, Maryann Bobinski & David Orentlicher,
eds., 2007).
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which biomedical research is conducted. Larger questions
of distributive justice can arise when interpreting or
critiquing statutes that regulate financing and access to
care. A recent example is the controversy over health
insurance coverage of contraceptives, now required under
the ACA.83 The study of health law can encourage critical
thinking about whether a particular legal approach should
be used instead of another, in light of their respective civic
and ethical implications.84 In short, as Annas has noted,
studying medical problems provokes thinking about what it
means to be human and “therefore what rights and
obligations humans should have.”85
Legal issues arise in clinical care, public health
programs, biomedical research, corporate structures,
product standards, conditions of employment, health
insurance coverage and financing, responsibilities for
children, and professional licensure, as well as the
physician-patient relationship. Health law specialists must
identify all laws that may affect a problem. Therefore,
health law applies law from many legal domains:
administrative
law,86
antitrust,
antidiscrimination,
83
FACT SHEET:
Institutions, OFFICE

Women’s Preventive Services and Religious

THE PRESS SEC’Y (Feb.
10, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheetwomen-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions; Robert Pear,
U.S. Clarifies Policy of Birth Control for Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/health/policy/
obama-administration-says-birth-control-mandate-applies-to-religiousgroups-that-insure-themselves.html; Catholic Business Owners Win
Temporary Halt in Birth Control Mandate, REUTERS (July 27, 2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/07__July/Catholic_business_owners_win_temporary_halt_to_Obama_birth_
control_mandate/.
84
See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and
OF

Health Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for
Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQUESNE L. REV. 271 (2012); Nicole
Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. P A. J. CONST. L. 431 (2011).
85
ANNAS, supra note 80, at 248.

86
A remarkable number of administrative agencies deal with
health issues, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, the
Food and Agriculture Drug Administration, the Environmental
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constitutional law, contracts, corporations, criminal law,
employment
law,
environmental
law,
insurance,
international law, patents, privacy, and torts. So many
different legal issues are connected to health that one might
devote one or more semesters to them without sacrificing
attention to important doctrinal learning, not only because
the field is so broad, but also because doctrine taught in
other courses can be learned within health law courses.87
Applied fields have many opportunities to use problemoriented methods, which require students to identify the
different legal tools that could be brought to bear on a real
problem. This approach is closer to law practice than the
study of domains of law or legal doctrine in the abstract. 88
Many health law professors have embraced practical
lawyering skills somewhat more enthusiastically than most
other specialties, offering students opportunities to work
with law firms, hospitals, and legislatures, and to draft
briefs amici curiae for relevant litigation.89 Northeastern
University School of Law is a leading example of
experiential (practice-based) legal education; its cooperative program places law students in supervised

Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
as well as state departments of health and environmental protection.
87
ANNAS, supra note 80, at 258.
88
See, e.g., Jonathan Todres, Beyond the Case Method: Teaching
Transactional Law Skills in the Classroom, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 375
(2009).
89
This is not to suggest that health law teaching is always
successful. The American Health Lawyers Association surveyed 94
health law practitioners in 2011 on their evaluations of new health law
graduates. Preliminary results suggest that those surveyed reported
that the new associates were best at legal research, analytical and
reasoning skills, and advocacy and persuasion. They were less well
prepared in writing skills, strategic thinking, problem solving,
administrative law and the regulatory process. Kevin Outterson,
Associate Professor of Law at Boston University, Presentation at the
American Health Law Association Annual Meeting (June 25, 2012)
(copy on file with author).
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practice settings, especially in public interest, international
and human rights law.90
Scholarship in health law is often relevant to policymakers. Health law issues appear in the news almost daily,
as well as in legislatures and courtrooms around the
country. Keeping abreast of the field necessarily requires
paying attention to real world developments, and this
includes problems of economics, politics, and moral
reasoning. One way to influence the development of the law
is to reach policy-makers, and health law scholars often
publish in medical and policy journals, such as Health
Affairs and the New England Journal of Medicine, which
policy-makers are likely to read.91 Empirical research is
also growing in health law, perhaps because of its emphasis
on effective solutions to real problems.92 Opportunities for

About Northeastern University Law School, NORTHEASTERN
UNIV., http://www.northeastern.edu/law/about/index.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2012); STEVENS, supra note 50, at 233, 241.
91
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Employers and the Exchanges Under
90

the Small Business Health Options Program: Examining the Potential
and the Pitfalls, 31(2) H EALTH AFF. 267 (Feb. 2012); Mark A. Hall,
Wenke Hwang & Allison Snow Jones, Model Safety-Net Programs Could
Care for the Uninsured at One-Half the Cost of Medicaid or Private
Insurance, 20 HEALTH AFF. 1698 (Sept. 2011); David A. Hyman &
William M. Sage, Do Health Reform and Malpractice Reform Fit
Together?, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Working Paper 2011-02 (2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/
2011/04/01/2011-04-Hyman-Sage.pdf.
92
See Martin Partington, Empirical Legal Research and PolicyMaking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
1002 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer, eds. 2010) (arguing that
empirical legal research should be valuable to policy makers, because it
can provide evidence to identify gaps and weaknesses in current law,
strategies for change, and areas where legislation is not likely to solves
problems, id at 2003-4). For examples of empirical research in health
law, see Nicolas P. Terry, Meaningful Adoption: What We Know and

Think We Know about the Financing, Effectiveness, Quality and Safety
of Electronic Medical Records, J. L EGAL MEDICINE (forthcoming 2012);
Ann Hwang, Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Creation of
State Basic Health Programs Would Lead to 4 Percent Fewer People
Churning Between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31(6) HEALTH AFF. 1314
(June 2012); Bernard Black, Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & William
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employment in health law grow almost as fast as the health
system, and this growth should accelerate as the ACA is
implemented. New ideas and new courses have entered the
curriculum most often when there was a need for new legal
skills. For example, in the 1800’s, Harvard Law School
prepared its graduates to become legislators and social
leaders by teaching the Federalist and also political
science.93 After the New Deal created new administrative
agencies, law schools began teaching administrative law
and policy to prepare graduates to lead those agencies.94
When the administrations of Presidents Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush favored more libertarian
approaches to governing, they began to appoint lawyers
trained in law and economics as well as Federalist Society
members to federal administrative positions and
judgeships.95
Today, there should be expanded
opportunities for employment for lawyers who know the
health care system, as well as those in environmental law.
These opportunities exist not only in private law practice,
but also in government agencies, legislatures, and
commercial and nonprofit health-related organizations.
Health law training can prepare lawyers for all these
options, because it includes systematic knowledge of health
systems.
Of course, the health law field is not without its own
problems. The most daunting is its scope.96 It is difficult to
master all the relevant legal domains and avoid

Sage, Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1988–2002, 2 J. E MPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005).
93
R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal
Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 154-175 (David Thelen ed.,
1988).
94
CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS
AND SUPREME C OURTS IN C OMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 197 (1998).
95
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 141, 158 (2008).
96
Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an Architecture of Health Law, 35
AM. J. L. & M ED. 67, 68 (2009).
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dilettantism.97 As a result, the quality of health law
scholarship remains uneven. Some of the health law field’s
advantages may undermine rigor in scholarship.
For
example, empirical and other research that is funded by
external donors may be influenced, perhaps unwittingly, by
the money itself or the donor’s goals, in the same ways that
conflicts of interest can affect biomedical research.98 If
funding is available for drafting new laws limiting liability,
for example, but not for laws reducing the risk of harm,
then more recommendations for liability limits are likely to
be produced.
Health law often considers valuable insights from other
disciplines, which should expand and enhance our view of
the law and its effects. At times, however, viewing a legal
issue only from a single disciplinary perspective can distort
the analysis.
Learning a little bit about economics,
sociology or epidemiology, for example, can be a dangerous
thing, if one begins to view all law from the perspective of
that discipline alone.99 In some cases, the new disciplinary
perspective overtakes the law, reversing their roles. If that
happens, the law can be seen simply as a tool to achieve the
97
In this respect, health law resembles emergency medicine,
which requires knowledge of many medical specialties. The medical
profession did not recognize emergency medicine as a distinct specialty
for many years, partly because of its applied nature. See generally
BRIAN J. ZINK, ANYONE, ANYTHING, ANYTIME—A HISTORY OF
EMERGENCY MEDICINE (2005).
98
The potential for conflicts of interest to create bias in biomedical
research is well known. See, e.g., BERNARD LO, CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 195
(2009); Lee Friedman & Elihu Richter, Relationship Between Conflicts
of Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004);
David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 284 JAMA
2234 (2000); Dennis Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of
Interest, 329 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 573 (1993).
99
Stevens call this a “monocausal vision of the legal system.”
STEVENS, supra note 50, at 272. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,

Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law
and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1133-39 (2003) (discussing

how various personal and experiential schemas bias how we process
information).
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goals of the other discipline, rather than a field with its own
values and goals.100
A different kind of bias may arise from one’s philosophy
of law or personal ideology.101 Although this is hardly
unique to health law, health law scholarship may have more
opportunities to fall prey to such bias, because it examines
so many controversial social issues on which most people
have strong opinions. It can be difficult to maintain a truly
neutral perspective when analyzing laws or doctrines that
affect the outcome of an issue important to the scholar.102
This is especially risky in applied fields like health law,
where scholars may have a somewhat shallow
understanding of the doctrine that applies to a hot-button
issue and neglect to adequately analyze precedent and
arguments that contradict a preferred interpretation.103 It
100 See David M. Trubek, The Place of Law and Social Science in
the Structure of Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 483 (1985). For

example, the concepts of law and economics added a valuable
perspective to legal analysis, but some adherents began to argue that
law itself should conform to classical microeconomic theory. TELES,
supra note 95, at 90-134. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE
RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 130-48
(2008) (describing the Federalist Society and the development of a
conservative movement to change constitutional law). Another example
can be found in public health law, where some scholars see the law as
simply a tool to achieve health, regardless of other goals, such as justice
and liberty. For a critique of this approach, see Wendy K. Mariner, Law
and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L.
247, 279-284 (2005).
101 See Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in
Research, 347 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 759 (2002).
102 See D ANIEL K AHNEMAN , T HINKING , F AST AND S LOW (2011)
(describing theories and empirical research in psychology demonstrating
how people often fail to analyze complex questions or accept evidence
that contradicts their experience, biases or preferences).
103 Compare, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas,
Handguns, Health, and the Second Amendment, 360 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 2360, 2361-63 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court had not
specifically decided whether the Second Amendment protected an
individual or collective right to bear arms before District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)), with Lawrence O. Gostin, The
Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 300 JAMA 1575 (2008) (noting that
earlier cases were understood to limit the Second Amendment’s
protection to a collective right to maintain a militia).
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can be easy to convince ourselves that our preferred
understanding of doctrine or precedent is the indisputably
correct interpretation, especially where precedent is limited
and open to interpretation.104 Some constitutional law
scholars seem to have succumbed to this error in arguing
about the scope of the Commerce Clause during the ACA
litigation.105
Strong convictions about the correct interpretation of
law can lead to advocacy. Of course, practicing lawyers
properly advocate for their clients, and make clear that they
are doing so. Scholarship is a different matter. It should
offer honest, balanced analysis that recognizes different
approaches and opinions. Scholarship does not preclude
arguing for a particular interpretation or approach, but
arguments are not statements of fact. There should be no
hidden agendas in scholarship. When scholarship presents
a preferred interpretation as fact or doctrine, it is poor
scholarship.106 It may also cross the line into advocacy. If it
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney
General of the United States for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
available
at
President
(Aug.
1,
2002),
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70964/00355_020801_001displ
ay.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General of
the United States for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://dspace.wrlc.
org/doc/bitstream/2041/70967/00355_020801_004display.pdf;
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice for William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel
of the [U.S.] Department of Defense (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf. See also
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE T ERROR PRESIDENCY (2007) (noting that these
memorandums were later withdrawn).
105 Brian Leiter, Why did most legal scholars, liberal and
conservative, fail to realize that the Supreme Court might take the silly
arguments against the “individual mandate” seriously?, Brian Leiter’s
Law School Reports, available at http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/
leiter/2012/04/why-did-most-legal-scholars-liberal-and-conservative-failto-realize-that-the-supreme-court-might-ta.html.
106 See for example Matthew L. Myers, Protecting Public Health by
104

Strengthening the Food and Drug Administration’s Authority over
Tobacco Products, 343 N EW ENGL. J. MED. 1806, 1808 (2000), for a

discussion of how health lawyers believed, before the Food Drug and
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fails to disclose its advocacy goal, it can be seen as
deceptive.
Scholars in the health law field have many tempting
opportunities to write as advocates, because the health care
system has so many issues of public importance on which
people hold strong views. When scholars write articles, as
opposed to advocacy or opinion pieces, on such topics, it is
essential to remain open-minded and use one’s critical
analysis skills to recognize facts and arguments that
challenge one’s preferred outcome. This is especially
important in health law, where decision makers may rely on
health law scholarship to develop policy far more than they
may rely on more esoteric scholarship on legal theory.
V. A BROADER VISION FOR HEALTH LAW
The Carnegie Report’s first recommendation for
improving legal education was to develop an integrated
curriculum with 3 goals:
(1) the teaching of legal doctrine and analysis,
which provides the basis for professional
growth; (2) introduction to the several facets of
practice included under the rubric of
lawyering, leading to acting with responsibility
for clients; and (3) exploration and assumption
of the identity, values and dispositions
consonant with the fundamental purposes of
the legal profession. Integrating the three
parts of legal education would better prepare
students for the varied demands of professional
legal work.107

Cosmetic Act was amended to authorize the FDA to regulate tobacco,
that the FDA already had statutory authority to regulate the tobacco
industry and were surprised when the Supreme Court found that the
FDA’s authority – to approve only safe and effective new drugs – could
not include tobacco in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120 (2000).
107 WILLIAM M. S ULLIVAN , A NNE C OLBY , J UDITH WELCH WEGNER ,
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: P REPARATION
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One need not accept the Report’s specific critiques or
conclusions to recognize that health law offers a good model
for a law school curriculum that integrates knowledge,
analysis, theory, attention to context, practical application,
values, and meaningful change.
A common theme underlying many proposals to reform
legal education is that of increasing attention to the role of
lawyers in society:
to inculcate in students an
understanding of the obligation of lawyers to the rule of law
and the importance of justice overall. Too often the lawyer’s
role is understood narrowly, focusing only on the ethics of
the private practice of law.108 If law is a profession, it must
stand for something, and that something should be
justice.109 Moreover, justice is for everyone, not only a
client. So, a deeper understanding of the role of lawyers
and the rule of law requires expanding our intellectual
horizons to encompass the role of law in society.
This begs the question of what law is; a question well
beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, it is worth
asking whether we can honestly say that law is a science
with formal rules and neutral, objective principles of justice.
I think not – as long as there are differing theories of justice
and no universally accepted standard for choosing among
them.110 The periodic waves of jurisprudential scholarship
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW , SUMMARY 8 (The Carnegie Found. for
the Advancement of Teaching ed. 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
SUMMARY].
The Carnegie Report recognized the difficulty of
implementing its recommendations. Remaking a curriculum is a
complicated undertaking that may require years of work. Human
beings are naturally reluctant to change what they are doing. See also
Carsik, supra note 37, at 814 (noting that in academia, curriculum
changes can be perceived as a threat to the value of the faculty’s work,
while there may also be personal rewards for working with other
faculty, learning their perspectives, and discovering new insights).
108 See Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What
Is the Purpose of Law School?, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48 (2003).
109 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 37, at 131; M MCCRATE REPORT,
supra note 37, at 140-41 (“striving to promote justice, fairness, and
morality” is one of the four fundamental values of the legal profession).
110 The vast literature on theories of justice is testimony to the
multitude of different perspectives. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
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from different perspectives are evidence of an unsettled
system.
So, what can we teach? If law constructs rules based on
justice and fairness, we can, and often do, turn to political
economy, economics, social theory, and moral philosophy to
try to determine what is fair. Each of these fields offers
important insights and perspectives to enrich our thinking.
But, each also has its own ambiguities and internal
conflicts, so that the same lack of consensus can reemerge in
different jargon: no ultimate neutral standard of justice.
Law professors, not fully expert in those fields, can be
understandably nervous about relying on any single
approach for ultimate insights.
For me, the only realistic answer is to live with the
messiness of law. It means giving up the idea that there
necessarily is a right answer, while continuing the search.
We need to keep asking why we should accept a legal
principle. What purpose does it serve, not only in principle,
but in people’s daily lives? It means analyzing doctrine in
the context of the world in which law applies and its
consequences for real people. It means recognizing the need
for change, interacting with people who are affected by the
law (and the absence of law), and, most importantly,
explicitly considering the social, financial, and moral
implications of law – not merely in theory, but as
experienced by all those affected.111
In his President’s Report to the Board of Overseers of
Harvard University for 1981-82, Derek Bok aptly compared
the legal system to the health care system, finding both to
be increasingly sophisticated, but also complex, costly and

JUSTICE (2009); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE (1989); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND
METHOD OF THE LAW (rev. ed. 1974); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
111 See generally R OBERTO M ANGABEIRA U NGER , L AW IN M ODERN
SOCIETY (1976); Harold Lasswell & Myres Mcdougal, Legal Education
and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 53 YALE
L. J. 203 (1943).
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maldistributed across the population.112 His conclusion
remains true today: “The blunt, inexcusable fact is that this
nation, which prides itself on efficiency and justice, has
developed a legal system that is the most expensive in the
world, yet cannot manage to protect the rights of its
citizens.”113 Although there may be no more court cases per
capita than in the past, there are more statutes and
regulations to negotiate, just as there are more medical
tests and therapies for disease. Like medical students, law
students often choose lucrative private practice specialties
rather than public service, partly to repay the increasing
cost of their educations. Specialties in both medicine and
law are more rewarding, both in money and prestige, than
primary care and general practice. The growth of large
multistate and multinational law firms mirrored the
consolidation of both hospital systems and insurance
companies, resulting in higher compensation for partners
and associates and higher fees for clients,114 although the
recession has dampened that trend.115 Major law firms
concentrate on providing services at rates that only large
organizations and wealthy individuals can pay. Low and
middle-income families and small businesses cannot afford
much justice.
Legal service organizations and public
defenders are generally underpaid while reaching only a
fraction of those who need their help. In this respect, the
health care system performs somewhat better, because
public and private health insurance, as well as
uncompensated care pools, are available.

112 Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training,
HARVARD MAGAZINE 38, 38, 40 (May-June 1983), reprinted in 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 570, 570, 572 (1983).
113 Id. at 41.
114 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in

the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization
of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621, 628, 631 (1994).
115 America’s Law Schools and Firms: Trouble with the Law, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2010, at 79, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/17461573.
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Bok’s report sparked many commentaries, but few
concrete changes.116
Here, health law may offer some
valuable perspectives. Because health lawyers often deal
with issues of equitable access to health care, they should be
particularly attuned to the ways in which laws promote or
hinder access to justice. Thus, they may be alert to
problems of justice and fairness in the legal system.117
The Affordable Care Act lays out a program for near
universal access to health care. Although the ACA does not
directly control the health care costs that created pressure
for reform, it puts the cost of care on the agenda for future
experiments and reforms.118 Perhaps it is time to initiate
reform not only in legal education, but, as Bok urged, in the
legal system as a whole. Real reform would go beyond
ongoing efforts to improve law school curricula. Reform
goals should include enabling access to essential legal
services for the entire population. For example, adapting
the model of medical residencies for graduates of medical
schools, creating a one or two year residency program in
which law graduates spend time working for low and
middle-income clients under the supervision of licensed
attorneys would give graduates important practical
experience and expand the services available to those in
need.119 To integrate such training and experience into the
116 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional
Reform, 45 MD. L. R EV. 274 (1986); Roger Cramton, The Trouble with
Lawyers (and Law Schools), 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1985); David M.
Trubek, Comments on the Bok Report - A Strategy for Legal Studies:
Getting Bok to Work, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586 (1983); Alfred F. Conrad,
The Law School’s Responsibility for the Quantity of Justice, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 600 (1983); Stephen Gillers, Great Expectations: Conceptions of
Lawyers at the Angle of Entry, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 662 (1983).
117 See generally J EROLD S. A UERBACH , U NEQUAL J USTICE :

LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
118 See An Act Improving The Quality Of Health Care and
Reducing Costs Through Increased Transparency, Efficiency And
Innovation, 2012 Mass. Acts, in which Massachusetts enacted payment
reform legislation intended to slow the growth of health care costs, only
a few years after enacting health care reform.
119 For early recommendations for similar clinical years, see
CARNEGIE, REPORT, supra note 37, at 192; STEVENS, supra note 50, at 242-3.
An alternative might be to borrow an approach from European legal
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curriculum before graduation, the third year of law school
could be transformed into an analog of medical school
clerkships. Third year students could work in government
agencies, non-profit, and legal service organizations. There
should be plenty of opportunities for such placements in the
health care system, but similar opportunities could surely
be found in education, housing, family law, energy and
environmental placements. In this way, legal education
might begin to respond more effectively to both the Ivory
Tower and Social Justice critiques and improve access to
justice for everyone.
VI. Conclusion
Arguments over the constitutionality of the ACA – in the
courts, in public debates, in scholarly articles, and blogs –
illustrate the pervasiveness of health law issues in society.
It also demonstrates that many participants in that debate,
both those for and against the ACA, remained wedded to
theories that have become disconnected from twenty first
century realities. Legal education may have something to
answer for in this respect. The more law moves away from
strict principles into nuanced adjustments to new
circumstances, the more lawyers will need to understand
the circumstances. As the search for more affordable,
responsive, and responsible legal education continues, it is
worth emulating the best features of health law. Health
law scholars should be proactive in translating their
successes into broader curriculum changes, especially
attention to context, both in theory and practice. Because
the context includes how law affects society at large,
meaningful reform should adopt as its ultimate goal
extending affordable access to justice for all.

education, which requires law graduates who pass a partial licensure
examination to practice for two or three years (much like a medical
residency) and then take another examination to qualify for full
licensure.

